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the accountant, was personally retained by the taxpayer and not by the attor-
ney. The attorney and accountant merely took a share of the recovery inde-
pendent of the other's fee. It is incidental that the fee of each is the same
percentage. But, this retainer agreement, since the money came from a lump
sum, may have been a technical departure from Canon 34. The policy reflected
in this case is not to deny recovery on the express contract for a technical
departure from Canon 34 in light of the evident beneficial results to the tax-
payer as long as the accountant does not render legal services. In light of this
decision, there is no indication whether the Court will or will not uphold an
agreement between a layman who renders non-legal services and an attorney to
split the attorney's fee, as where the attorney personally retains an accountant
whose salary is computed according to the attorney's fee.
Anthony S. Kowalski
CONTRACT INTENDED TO RELEASE LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE INVALIDATED-
LANGUAGE NOT SUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT
The defendant is a manufacturer of motion picture film. A number of
reels of its film were sold to the plaintiff in standard packages on which were
printed certain conditions of sale stating, in part, that the film price did not
include processing, and that, except for replacement of the film, defendant
would not assume lability of any kind in any subsequent handling of the film.1
The plaintiff, in fulfillment of a contract with another party, traveled to Alaska,
exposed the film and returned it to defendant for processing. While in defend-
ant's possession, a substantial part of the film was damaged beyond usefulness.
The case was submitted to the Appellate Division on an agreed statement of
facts. 2 The Court held, first, that an inference of negligence was warranted and,
second, that the conditions of sale could not be construed so as to relieve de-
fendants of liability for negligence. In an appeal based on the latter point, the
Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, since contracts purporting to absolve
the offeror from liability for negligence are not favored by the courts, and
must therefore meet strict standards of interpretation, the language of the
present coritract was not sufficiently clear to relieve the defendants of liability.
Willard Van Dyke Prods. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 189 N.E.2d
693, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1963).
The agreement involved here purported to release the offeror of future
liability for ordinary negligence. Although the rule applicable to such agree-
ments may generally be said to support their validity,3 considerations of policy
1. The relevant language is as follows: "This film will be replaced if defective in
manufacture, labeling, or packaging, or if damaged or lost by us or any subsidiary company.
Except for such replacement, the sale or subsequent handling of this film for any purpose
is without warranty or other liability of any kind. Since dyes used with color films, like
other dyes, may, in time, change, this film will not be replaced for, or otherwise warranted
against, any change in color." Instant case at 303, 189 N.E.2d at 694, 239 N.Y.S.2d at 339.
2. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1920, ch. 925, § 546.
3. See Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962
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and strict rules of construction have narrowly restricted the usefulness of these
contracts.4 An exculpatory agreement, executed prior to injury, will not relieve
the offeror from liability for negligence characterized either as gross, or wanton,
wilful and reckless. It is frequently stated that such agreements are invalid
where the releasor stands in an inferior bargaining position, or where the
interest of the public is involved. 6 Thus, an employer may not in this manner
be relieved of liability to his employees,7 and where the duty involved is that
owed by a public utility to its subscribers, such contracts are similarly invali-
dated, the utility being denied exculpation in most such instances due to its
monopolistic bargaining advantages. 8 Earlier New York decisions upheld con-
tracts relieving a common carrier from liability for negligence to its patrons,
9
but later holdings have tended to restrict this rule to cases where the carrier has
furnished its services either without .compensation,' ° or at a reduced rate."
(1961) (personal injury, release of total liability); Graves v. Davis, 235 N.Y. 315, 139 N.E.
280 (1923) (maritime towing service, agreement limiting liability); Kirshenbaum v.
General Outdoor Adv. Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 180 N.E. 245 (1932) (landlord-tenant release
upheld). But see N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 234 (invalidating such agreements).
4. It may be more correct to phrase the rule as Williston does, i.e., such agreements
. may be valid." 6 Williston, Contracts § 1751 B (rev. ed. 1938).
5. Restatement, Contracts § 574, comment a (1932); Krivitsky & Cohen, Inc. v.
Western Union Tel. Co. Inc., 129 Misc. 431, 221 N.Y. Supp. 525 (Munlc. Ct. N.Y. 1927)
modified on other grounds, 227 N.Y. Supp. 836 (lst Dep't 1928)."
6. Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 296, 177 N.E.2d 925, 926, 220 N.Y.S.2d
962, 964 (1961); 6 Williston, Contracts § 1751 C (rev. ed. 1938); Restatement, Con-
tracts § 575 (1932).
7. Johnston v. Fargo, 98 App. Div. 436, 90 N.Y. Supp. 725' (4th Dep't 1904), aff'd,
184 N.Y. 379, 77 N.E. 388 (1906); Kelly v. Central Railroad, 178 App. Div. 685, 165 N.Y.
Supp. 862 (2d Dep't 1917); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Cochran, 277 App. Div. 625, 102
N.Y.S.2d 65 (3d Dep't 1951).
8. Emery v. Rochester Telephone Corp., 156 Misc. 562, 282 N.Y. Supp. 280 (Sup.
Ct. 1935), affd, 246 App. Div. 787, 268 N.Y. Supp. 439 (4th Dep't 1935), rev'd on other
grounds, 271 N.Y. 306, 3 N.E.2d 434 (1936) (invalidating exculpatory agreement where
damage arose from failure to provide service at time of emergency). But see Hamilton
Employment Serv. v. New York Tel. Co., 253 N.Y. 468, 171 N.E. 710 (1930) (contract
limiting liability for directory errors upheld).
9. Nicholas v. New York Central and Hudson River R.R. Co., 89 N.Y. 370 (1882)
(property damage); Maynard v. Syracuse, B. & N.Y.R.R. Co., 71 N.Y. 180 (1877)
(property damage). But see Cole v. Goodwin & Story, 19 Wend. 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of
judicature 1838) and Hollister v. Nowlen, 19 Wend. 234 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of judicature 1838).
The early 19th century New York courts feared that, without liability, the small carrier
would defraud its patrons. The late 19th century courts, however, were faced with different
considerations, i.e., the inequality of bargaining power as created by monopolistic or
oligopolistic carriers. Consequently, in 1838 such agreements were invalid, but in the
Spencerian days of 1882 they were upheld. The federal courts, though, have consistently
invalidated these agreements where the defendant is a common carrier. See Bank of Kentucky
v. Adams Ex. Co., 93 U.S. 174 (1876); The Saratoga, 20 Fed. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1884).
10. Montalbano v. New York Central R.R. Co., 267 App. Div. 617, 47 N.Y.S.2d
877 (4th Dep't 1944); Kroehling v. City of New York, 270 App. Div. 909, 61 N.Y.S.2d
474 (2d Dep't 1946). In each case, plaintiff was defendant's employee, thus it was a
jury question as to whether the pass was issued as a mere gratuity, or as part of the
employment contract.
11. See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 189 (a carrier may not contract in such a manner
as to impair his obligation of reasonable care). But see Anderson v. Erie R.R. Co., 223 N.Y.
277, 119 N.E. 557 (1918); National Blouse Corp. v. Feison, 274 App. Div. 164, 79 N.Y.S.2d
765 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 299 N.Y. 612, 86 N.E.2d 177 (1949); Chenango Textile Corp.
v. Willock, 247 App. Div. 638, 288 N.Y. Supp. 270 (1st Dep't 1936); Kaydro Fashions,
Inc. v. S. & H. Express, Inc., 236 N.Y.S.2d 670 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1962) (holding that
liability for negligence may be limited where a lower rate is charged).
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Although the controlling principle of invalidation is said to be based upon the
relationship of the parties, cases of invalidation based on inequality of bargain-
ing power involving defendants other than public utilities, carriers, or employers
are not to be found. It is thus uncertain whether the courts are in fact referring
to a broad principle, or whether there is a tendency to pigeon-hole cases accord-
ing to the categories noted above.1
2
The courts look with disfavor upon agreements purporting to release persons
from liability for negligence, and consequently such contracts are interpreted
most strictly against the wrongdoer.' 3 The language must be clear and un-
equivocal,' 14 and the construction sought to be placed upon it by the defendant
must have been obvious to the releasor upon a casual reading of the agreement. 16
The above discussion paraphrases the standard of interpretation as expressed
in a number of New York cases.16 Applying this test, the Court of Appeals,
in a wrongful death action, recently held that an agreement purporting to
release the defendant ". . . of any and all responsibility or liability of any
nature whatsoever for ...personal injury . .. ," was per se ineffectual.
17
From this case, and others similar, it may safely be inferred that the de facto
test is somewhat more rigid than the above phrases would suggest. Boilerplate
language niay fall ostensibly within this standard (as the above quoted language
does), yet the recent decisions consistently invalidate agreements of that nature. 18
Where, on the other hand, the agreement specifically disclaims liability for
negligence, and refers as well to the specific injury for which compensation is
sought, the release may be upheld.' 9
The Court in deciding the instant case, without referring to the relation-
12. The instant case is illustrative: Although the Federal Trade Commission has con-
cerned itself on more than one occasion with the monopolistic behavior of this defendant,
the issue of inequality of bargaining power was not discussed either at the Appellate Division
or at the Court of Appeals. It is submitted that in addition to an oligopolistic seller,
the service or commodity sold must be one of the conventional necessities. See Fed. Trade
Comm'n v. Eastman Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Federal Trade Com-
mission, 158 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946).
13. See Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d
962 (1961) (expressing the applicable New York standard). But see 6 Williston, Contracts
§ 1751 B (rev. ed. 1938) ("[I]f possible, [such] bargains are construed not to confer this
immunity.") The latter would appear to express more precisely the position taken by the
New York courts.
14. Bernstein v. Seaciff Beach Club, Inc., 35 Misc.2d 153, 228 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Nassau
County Ct. 1962) ; Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, 5 N.Y.2d 1016, 158 N.E.2d 128, 185
N.Y.S.2d 268 (1959), modifying, 6 A.D.2d 223, 177 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1958); Walters
v. Rao Electrical Equipment Co., 289 N.Y. 57, 43 N.E.2d 810 (1942).
15. Rappaport v. Phil Gottlieb-Satter, Inc., 280 App. Div. 424, 426, 114 N.Y.S.2d
221, 223 (1st Dep't 1952), aff'd, 305 N.Y. 594, 111 N.E.2d 647 (1953); Boll v. Sharpe and
Dobme, 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st. Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d
836 (1954); Howard v. Handier Bros. and Winnell, 279 App. Div. 72, 107 N.Y.S.2d 749, (1st.
Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 990, 106 N.E.2d 67 (1952).
16. Ibid.; See cases cited note 14 supra.
17. Kaufman v. American Youth Hostels, supra note 14.
18. Bernstein v. Seacliff Beach Club, Inc., 35 Misc.2d 153, 228 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Nassau
County Ct. 1962); Boll v. Sharpe and Dohme, 281 App. Div. 568, 121 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1st
Dep't 1953), aff'd, 307 N.Y. 646, 120 N.E.2d 836 (1954).
19. Ciofalo v. Vic Tanney Gyms, 10 N.Y.2d 294, 177 N.E.2d 925, 220 N.Y.S.2d 962
(1961).
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ship of the parties, was unanimous in finding the language of the agreement
insufficiently explicit to relieve the defendant of liability for negligence. The
Court implied that both the duty violated and the injury sustained were con-
templated by the terms of the agreement, but that greater explicitness or
specificity would be required for the agreement to be effective. Although the
release was held invalid on the basis of its language alone, it was further noted
that, since the release was accepted at the time the film was purchased, the
plaintiff could reasonably have believed the agreement did not relate to its
return for processing.
In all cases involving exculpatory agreements of the type discussed here,
the essential argument revolves around notions of freedom of contract on the
one hand, and on the other, the reprehensible quality of contracts which re-
lieve a tortfeasor from liability for his wrongful acts.20 Ideally, each case should
turn upon the extent to which its own peculiar facts load one or the other of
the above conflicting considerations.21 In New York, however, it would appear
that an overly cautious respect for stare decisis has resulted in a loss of the
flexibility which this formula seems to offer. Invalidation on the basis of the
parties' relationship would now seem to be restricted to fixed categories,22 and
although the courts have been able to carry out their policy of invalidation
through strict construction of contractual language, this approach at the same
time informs the alert draftsman of the sort of language required for a valid
exculpatory clause. It is safe to assume that properly worded releases will thus
appear more frequently and that they will be at least as acceptable to the
layman as boilerplate would be. One could further conclude that the rule of
strict construction of contractual language is both unrealistic (since the lay
releasor cannot be selective on this basis) and impractical (since it will cease
to be effective wherever it is understood). Ultimately then, if the courts wish
to continue restricting the usage of these agreements, they must resort to a
different rationale. The legislature apparently has undertaken a piecemeal ap-
proach toward outlawing these agreements,2 3 but this resolves only a small part
of the judicial problem. It is submitted that the courts could restrict validation
of these releases to a limited area, for example, in purely "take-it-or-leave-it"
situations where the defendant has had no opportunity to protect himself from
the consequences of his negligence. 24 Admittedly this would be a bold departure
from precedent, but it may be more responsive to the underlying reasons for
judicial disfavor of these contracts.
James B. Denman
20. See Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1954) (presenting a lengthy
discussion of these ideas, the majority holding according to public policy, the minority
holding that freedom of contract should prevail).
21. See generally Ibid.
22. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
23. See N.Y. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-719 ("Limitation of consequential damages
for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable... 1)
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 234; N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 189.
24. Laufer, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 1962 Survey of New York Law, 14
Syracuse L. Rev. 309, 319 (1963).
